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Bertrand Russell, The Utilitarian
Pacifist
Bertrand Russell, Pacifiste utilitariste
Olivier Esteves
1 Having emerged from a decade in his Cambridge Ivory Tower to write a three-volume
essay which would change mathematics,1 Bertrand Russell became almost overnight a
worshipped or hated public speaker, organiser of public meetings, editorialist for socialist
and  /  or  pacifist  papers  such  as  The  Labour  Leader or  The  Tribunal,  negotiator  with
ministers to guarantee the exemption of conscientious objectors, and also a man who
pleaded with Asquith, Lloyd George and Woodrow Wilson. All of this would cost him not
only his job at Trinity College Cambridge but also much of his freedom of movement,2
would prevent him from going to Harvard, and then send him to Brixton prison to think
twice about having become “one of the most mischievous cranks in this country”, 3 to
quote Lord Newton’s moving encomium. As it would be unrealistic to try to give here a
thorough account of Russell’s political evolution in these pivotal years, I have decided
instead to focus primarily on the complexity of his pacifist stance, partly dependent on
the many changes in the war, whether at home or abroad. The reason for this focus on
pacifism is that it seems to me that this household name in the British intellectual4 canon
is too often limited to a few comfortable stereotypes, which contribute to making him a
one-dimensional, innocuous sage, almost like some British Dalai Lama enjoying cosy chats
on BBC4, during the many years when he was very old. This originally half-baked notion
was confirmed to me by a few discussions with members of the Russell Peace Foundation,
notably Tony Simpson, at a time when the project to translate Russell’s Great War texts
into French started to painfully materialize.5 
2 The crucial First World War period, when he was already in his forties, suggests that he
was  both  an  indefatigable  campaigner  for  peace  and a  man with  a  very  ambivalent
opinion on pacifism itself. For herein lies a paradox : the very man who took so many
risks to promote peace cannot be placed alongside other great peace champions, like
Gandhi, Tolstoy, or G. M. Trevelyan. To investigate this paradox involves looking into the
various  categories  of  war  elaborated  by  Russell,  which  delineate  a  consequentialist
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attitude towards war, and even towards pacifism. This is how one can make sense of his at
first very enthusiastic and then lukewarm support for the No-Conscription Fellowship
(N.C.F). Lastly, the reason he was to take some critical distance from a group of radical
people  (led  by  figures  he  nevertheless  saw  as  heroes),  has  to  do  with  his  specific
viewpoint on matters which became more pressing as the war developed, i. e. the link
between pacifism, violence and revolution. 
 
Justified wars 
The four categories of war
3 In an article entitled “The Ethics of War” (January 1915) which he contributed to The
International Journal of Ethics, the British philosopher tries to answer the ethical question :
which wars, if any, can be justified ? Aware that there is always a degree of simplification
involved in such a job, Russell nevertheless ventures a distinction between four types of
war : 1/ Wars of colonization ; 2/ Wars of principle ; 3/ Wars of self-defence ; 4/ Wars of
prestige. He argues that the first two may be justified, the third seldom so, “except as
against  an  adversary  of  inferior  civilization”,6 whereas  the  fourth,  to  which the  current
conflict  belonged,  was  absolutely  never  acceptable.  The  points  he  makes  about  the
legitimacy  of  wars  of  colonization  are  interesting  in  that  they  evince  a  sense  of
ethnocentric7 pride rooted in a liberal  ideal of (Western) civilization which he would
more and more dismiss as jingoistic humbug as the war dragged on. 
4 He starts off by saying that such wars of colonization often belong to the past. Then, at
this fairly early stage of World War I, he admits that it is hard “to condemn the process by
which the American continent has been acquired for European civilization”.8 He goes on to state
that “in order that such wars may be justified, it is necessary that there should be a very great and
undeniable difference between the civilization of the colonizers and that of the dispossessed natives
”.9 Countless times during the First World War, Russell warned that the conflict would
tragically “lower the standards” of civilisation, which might precipitate the downfall of
Europe just like Rome itself had fallen.10 By 1919, in “Socialism and Liberal Ideals”, he
would both dismiss “the exploitation of inferior races” as the “tyrannical phase” of “capitalism
”, and “modern imperialism” as the “tyrannical phase” of “nationalism”,11 ideas that he had
toyed with in 1916 and 1917, for example in his series of talks “The World as it can be
made”.12 
5 “Wars of principle” may sometimes be justified. These too often belong to the past, and
Russell  illustrates  this  with  the  example  of  the  Protestant  /  Catholic  wars,  and  the
American or English civil wars. In these, one side at least is “honestly convinced that the
progress of mankind depends upon the adoption of certain beliefs or institutions”13 and is ready
to  wage  war  for  it.  These  noble  ideals  notwithstanding,  such  wars  are  often
counterproductive and are generally legitimated on flimsy grounds. 
6 Wars  of  “self-defence”  are  almost  universally  acknowledged as  legitimate,  and are  “
condemned only by Christ and Tolstoy”. Nevertheless, self-defence is very often brandished
as an excuse by war-mongers : “the justification of wars of self-defence is very convenient, since
so far as I know there has never yet been a war which was not one of self-defence”.14 Russell goes
on to deconstruct the claims of legitimacy by each belligerent nation, wherein it becomes
obvious that self-defence is confused with an alleged threat of aggression, or the threat to
one nation’s supremacy in one or another respect (such as control of the seas for Britain).
Bertrand Russell, The Utilitarian Pacifist
Revue Française de Civilisation Britannique, XX-1 | 2015
2
7 Lastly, “wars of prestige” are dismissed as unjustifiable :  the ongoing war, which was
primarily about the “hegemony of the Balkans […] is entirely a question of prestige”. Russell
associates such conflicts with the nations’ desire for triumph, and the fear of humiliation
at the hands of our enemies. He then expresses the hope that, much like individuals in
Anglo-Saxon countries have abandoned the practise of duelling and dismissed it as a “folly
and delusion”,  the honour of nations will  not “be measured by their  willingness to inflict
slaughter”.15 In  more  metaphorical  terms,  he  declares,  in  “War  and  Non-Resistance”
(August  1915,  The Atlantic  Monthly),  that  “we should  have  put  Shakespeare  on the  Nelson
Monument, and given Apsley House to Darwin. But the citizens that every nation honours most are
those who have killed the greatest number of foreigners”.16 National honour is not negative per
se: it is to be sought for in artistic or scientific terms (corresponding to what he calls
“creative impulses” in Principles of Social Reconstruction) whereas it is to be dismissed as
destructive in military or imperialistic fields (corresponding to what he calls “possessive
impulses”). 
 
Understanding wars in order to promote peace
8 Despite the limits in such categorizations, what this all bespeaks on Russell’s part is a
willingness, which he would never shed throughout the war, to understand “Why Nations
Love War”, to quote the title of an October 1914 article. He knows full well that lies and
deceit and war propaganda do not suffice to produce the London crowds that, much to his
amazement, paraded gaily on August 3rd 1914 in Trafalgar Square. He refers to these days
in “The Rights of War” (Collected papers, p. 7)
“Those who saw the London crowds, during the nights leading up to the declaration
of war, saw a whole population, hitherto peaceable and humane, precipitated in a
few days down the steep slope to primitive barbarism...” 
9 Nor do lies and propaganda alone produce a million British volunteers in just 6 months. 
10 Ideas on human psychology would help him make sense of the fundamental impulses in
man (distrust of foreigners, fear, frustration, the gregarious instinct, desire for triumph)
that are conducive to war. Russell doesn’t seem to have read Freud before 1917; he was
introduced to Freud’s writings 17 by a few Bloomsbury acquaintances at Garsington, the
Oxfordshire abode of his muse Ottoline Morrell. Also key in his appreciation of human
impulses was his ephemeral albeit very intense friendship with D. H. Lawrence, which was
instrumental in his elaboration of a series of talks entitled Principles of Social Reconstruction
(1916), later to become his most important contribution to moral and political thinking. 
11 True, the idea that there is lurking in man a wide range of brutal instincts, normally held
in check in civilised life, was a somewhat pedestrian one, even back in 1914. What is less
common is the brilliantly scathing political use that Russell makes of this, where more
often than not he displays almost Swiftian talent : 
This war is not being fought for any rational end: it is being fought because, at first,
the nations wished to fight, and now they are angry and determined to win victory.
Everything  else  is  idle  talk,  artificial  rationalizing  of  instinctive  actions  and
passions.  When two dogs fight in the street,  no one supposes that anything but
instinct prompts them, or that they are inspired by high and noble ends. But if they
were  capable  of  what  is  called  thought,  if  they  had  been  taught  that  Dog  is  a
rational animal, we may be sure that a superstructure of belief would grow up in
them during the combat. They fight really because something angers them in each
other’s smell. But if their fighting were accompanied by intellectual activity, the
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one would say he was fighting to promote the right kind of smell (Kultur), and the
other to uphold the inherent canine right of running on the pavement (democracy).
Yet this would not prevent the bystanders from seeing that their action was foolish,
and that they ought to be parted as soon as possible. And what is true of dogs in the
street is equally true of nations in the present war. 18 
12 However  biologically  rooted  these  impulses  are,  Russell  is  aware  that  they  are  not
immutable;  they  largely  depend  on  education  and  external  circumstances,  which
politicians and the press manage to shape in their own interests. This is true as far as the
fear of foreigners is concerned: if a man arms himself against his neighbour, the latter
will be afraid and arm himself in turn, forcing the first man to arm himself more, etc.
Russell  was  convinced  that  rather  than  guaranteeing  peace  and  stability,  armament
generated fear and a feeling of insecurity, thus becoming the very root of a war which it
was supposed originally to forestall. He believed that weak armies, or no armies at all,
were preferable. 
13 In order to prove his point he devised an extraordinary scenario, which was all the more
provocative as it was published at a time when hatred climaxed, in August 1915, a few
months after the sinking of the Lusitania and the first use of mustard gas at Ypres. In
“War and Non-Resistance” (The Atlantic Monthly, Aug. 1915), he imagines a situation in
which British people, having been thoroughly educated in the principles of passive
resistance, opposed their civil and moral strength against the brutal force of potential
German occupiers. There would be a few killings and many injustices, but far fewer than
in the present conflict, since “there would be no glory to be won, not even enough to earn one
iron cross. The Germans could not congratulate themselves upon their military prowess, or imagine
that they were displaying the stern self-abnegation believed to be shown by willingness to die in the
fight”.19 After some time, having realized that they couldn’t govern without the consent of
the indigenous population, the Germans would have to leave and go home.
 
A consequentialist attitude 
14 What  Russell  displays  is  a  consequentialist  attitude  both  towards  war  and  towards
pacifism, more in tune with the Weberian ethics of responsibility than with the Weberian
ethics of conviction. In contrast with Tolstoy or G. M. Trevelyan, he does not consider
actions to be inherently right or wrong. He believes that “if we judge conduct, as I think we
ought, by its power of promoting what we consider a good life or a good society, we cannot expect
such simplicity in our moral precepts, and we must expect all of them to be subject to exceptions”.20
This is a classic debate that informs much of the history of pacifism in Britain. Historian
Martin Ceadel makes an apt distinction between pacifists,  “supporting the unconditional
repudiation of war” 21 and a broader group of loosely defined “pacificists”, who are inclined
to support the conditional use of force whilst international mechanisms empowered to
prevent war are constituted. 
15 Arguably, Russell also developed a consequentialist attitude towards pacifism itself. He
grew more and more wary of peace for peace’s sake, although he unabashedly clamoured
for peace negotiations, as seen in two short July 1916 leaflets he produced for the No-
Conscription Fellowship : “Why Not Peace Negotiations ?” and “What Are We Fighting For ?”
22 He was irked by certain Quakers who promoted peace without really knowing how to do
so, let alone what to do with peace once it was established. In private he described some
meeting of the Union for Democratic Control as “eight fleas talking of building a pyramid”; in a
June 1915 letter to Ottoline Morrell, he lamented the ineffectiveness of some activists by
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pointing out that “one might as well send a Quaker deputation to Etna and ask it not to erupt”.23
Many of these statements were made in letters, since Russell, like others, depended a
great deal on Quaker money to foster his cause. Likewise, despite his true admiration for
its  president  E.  D.  Morel,  whose  imprisonment  he  denounced  in  “Six  Months  for
Spreading Truth”, Russell gradually distanced himself from the largest pacifist body in
war-time Britain, the Union for Democratic Control, whose demands 24 were, he felt, more
appropriate to the post-war period than to war-time itself.  By Spring 1916,  he much
preferred the radicalism and the immediate demands of the No-Conscription Fellowship, to
whom we now turn. 
 
In the thick of it with conscientious objectors 
Finding the heroes he was looking for 
16 As Russell was, in March 1916, still giving the lectures at London’s Caxton Hall which
would soon be published as Principles of Social Reconstruction,  he became more familiar
with the claims made by the No-Conscription Fellowship, and with a few of its leaders, whom
he saw as heroes: Clifford Allen, Catherine Marshall, and Fenner Brockway. The N.C.F. had
been created in November 1914 by radicals who believed -rightly, as it turned out- that
conscription was an unavoidable next step in the British war drive. This clashed with the
liberal ideals which were the very essence of Russell’s politics. The British philosopher
was far from alone in thinking this: Leonard Hobhouse had anticipated conscription after
listening to Edward Grey’s August 3rd 1914 speech. In a letter to his sister a few days later,
he commented : “As to Liberalism it died last Monday”. As for Russell, he woefully noted in a
letter to Ottoline Morrell  a few weeks before the conscription bill  was introduced in
Parliament : “conscription is so horrible it makes one forget everything else”. 25 
17 Conscientious objectors were not prepared to fight because of a profound belief in the “
sanctity of  human life and the brotherhood of  men”, a phrase which was central to N.C.F
propaganda. This refusal was either religiously, morally or politically motivated, and the
Military Service Act introducing conscription allowed for certain exemptions, notably for
Quakers.  Lloyd George had himself guaranteed that those unwilling to fight for these
reasons wouldn’t be forced to, but that he would personally see to it that those who
balked even at alternative, non-combatant service would be given a very hard time. 26
Simultaneously,  the Northcliffe press made sure to stigmatise these C.O.s as so many
“shirkers”. In fact, no sooner had the expression “conscientious objectors” entered the
English language than it became a term of abuse, as Arthur Marwick notes in his classic
study The Deluge. 27 
18 Bertrand Russell and Catherine Marshall spent the whole of 1917 running the N.C.F, since
both Clifford Allen and Fenner Brockway were in prison. Russell wrote 53 editorials for
The Tribunal, and ran the organisation flawlessly: according to historian Charles Kennedy,
“Russell’s  association with  the  N.C.F  unquestionably  cost  him a  good deal  more  than he  had
bargained for, but no member contributed more [to] the indomitable spirit and indeed the very
survival  of  the  organization”.  28 He  displayed  a  real  talent  at  mediating  between  the
“absolutists” (those who refused either non-combatant service or civilian service) and the
“alternativists”  (those  who  on  the  contrary  were  ready  to  accept  such  tasks).
Theoretically,  he sided with the absolutists,  for  whom he had great  admiration,  and
wished time and again he were eligible for service, since there was clearly a streak of the
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martyr in him. Yet when it became clear that absolutists made up but a small minority of
conscientious objectors, he chose to remain both pragmatic and faithful to his liberal
ideals:  “if  you  disbelieve  in  alternative  service,  stand  out  against  it,  no  matter  what  the
Government may do to you; if you believe in it, take it, no matter what the absolutists may say to
you”. 29 
19 As soon as Russell finished his lectures at Caxton Hall he devoted his whole time and
energy to the conscientious objectors. He discovered two talents on which the NCF drew
heavily: one as an orator, the other one as a polemicist. He lambasted the government’s
schemes to find solutions to the question of conscientious objectors, and expressed his
distaste of tribunal appeals. These were often made up of rustic civilians, none of whom
had had “anything approaching a good education”, and who were often hell-bent on meting
out hard labour sentences to those they saw as a bunch of shirkers: “A tribunal to judge
conscience must be at all times grotesque, but surely the Cambridge Appeal Tribunal reaches the
limits of absurdity” (“Folly, doctor-like, controlling skill”).  30 He was vitriolic about the
Pelham Committee, whose function it was to find alternative service for certain objectors:
31 “The man who has been teaching Physics must be made to hoe potatoes; the man who has been
hoeing potatoes must be set to teach Physics. Potatoes and Physics both cease to be produced by
this arrangement; but both men suffer, so all is well”. 32 More importantly, he published “The
Everett Leaflet”, to defend an absolutist teacher from St Helens, a document which was
circulated free on April 19th and 20th; between 250 000 and half a million copies were sent
out. As of that date, when Russell admitted to having been the author of this text to The
Times (“Adsum Que Feci”, 17. 05. 1916), the Home Office became determined to muzzle
him, whilst avoiding making a martyr of him. This was one of the reasons why, despite his
fame both before and after the war, Russell had to publish several leaflets anonymously,
or under a false name; the real authorship of certain key texts in World War One pacifism
was  only  revealed  years  later,  often  by  some of  Russell’s  comrades,  such  as  Fenner
Brockway. This was the case for instance of I Appeal Unto Caesar (summer 1917), officially
authored by Margaret Hobhouse, and which sold more than 17 000 copies in a very short
time. 
 
The unsent letter 
20 The paradox in Russell’s total involvement with the N.C.F is that, whilst he devoted nearly
all his time and energy to them (especially in 1917), he became fairly rapidly dissatisfied
with the way their immediate objectives blinded them to a full appreciation of the bigger
picture, i. e. the fundamental evil of the capitalist system, now made all the more glaring
by the Russian events. In a way, hearing about the Russian revolution in March 1917 came
in the nick of time, just like hearing about the Conscientious Objectors one year before. In
the first days of the war, he had made it clear that liberalism as he saw it was not served
by the Liberal party, which had unashamedly betrayed a glorious political heritage in
Britain, to which his own family belonged. 33 What followed was then quite logical: he
became keenly interested in socialism, promoted the abolition of the capitalist system in
The World As It Can Be Made, and joined the Independent Labour Party on June 10th 1917,
one week after the Leeds Convention, where radicals of different hues had planned the
establishment of British Soviets.
21 The  Collected  Papers  (Vol  13) includes  a  quite  extraordinary  document:  a  letter  of
resignation from the N.C.F. which Russell wrote on May 18th 1917, and which he marked
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“Private and Confidential”. It turned out that he never actually sent this letter, that the
paper was all crumpled because he kept it in his pocket for a while, probably in case some
meeting turned very sour. Be that as it may, the contents of the document highlights
certain of his concerns about his place within the N.C.F. The fact that he never revealed
anything about the document probably boils down to his sincere admiration for the likes
of Allen, Marshall and Brockway. 
 
Pacifism, revolution and violence 
The Russian revolution
22 The  writing  of  this  unsent  resignation  letter  was  undoubtedly  prompted  by  the
encouraging news from Russia, where the Petrograd Soviet was demanding immediate
peace without annexation or indemnity, and by the large meeting at the Albert Hall in
London, organized on March 31st by socialist George Lansbury. This was a real success,
and Russell was there in the enthusiastic crowd to listen to speeches by radical trade-
union leaders, Robert Smillie and Robert Williams among others. 
23 In the unsent letter, Russell tried to gauge the possibilities of a revolutionary spill-over in
his country: “I do not myself believe that there is any chance of a revolution in this
country, but there is reason to suppose that the Government thinks otherwise, and that
fear of revolution will be a powerful motive with the authorities in leading them to desire
an early end to the war”. 34 This type of (unpublished) statement helps us understand how
Russell was pushing for urgent and radical social reforms at a time of great industrial
unrest, especially in South Wales (where he spoke 35 times in the summer of 1916) and
Western Scotland, (where Robert Smillie had to read his “The World As it Can Be Made”
lecture,  Russell  being banned from the Glasgow area).  At a time when the N.C.F was
becoming  more  and  more  embroiled  in  internecine  feuds  over  absolutists  and
alternativists, Russell realized that the urgency of the social situation, spurred by the
international context and the growing demands for peace all tended to make the N.C.F a
somewhat inadequate tool. This was all the more so as many N.C.F. activists -especially
Quaker absolutists- were unwilling to take part in the socialist movement. What is more,
the larger number of  those who were unwilling to serve would soon be drawn from
workers  potentially  “combed out”  from hitherto  strategic  industries,  such as  miners
afraid to be sent to the front, at a time (Spring 1917) when soldiers were lacking more
than ever. 
 
The urgency of the broader picture
24 In  July  1917,  Russsell  published  three  consecutive  texts  for  The  Tribunal,  the  N.C.F
newspaper.  These  all  deal  with  the  connections  between  pacifism  and  revolution:
“Pacifism and Economic Revolution”, “A Pacifist Revolution?”, “Pacifism and Revolution”,
and articulate a clearer view of his consequentialist approach to pacifism. These, to be
sure, make up a rhetorical trilogy to convert pacifists to the revolutionary movement.
Fundamentally, Russell argues that the genuine pacifist neither seeks peace for its own
sake (or order and security per se), nor for himself (his individual tranquillity or comfort).
He strives for peace in order that all  human lives may flourish freely,  because what
motivates a pacifist is the brotherhood of men. That brotherhood naturally makes the
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pacifist keenly aware of all forms of oppression, be they national, economic, political,
religious,  etc.  This  is  why the pacifist  should struggle to abolish capitalist  and State
domination, in order to wholly rebuild society on a new basis. 
25 In the unsent resignation letter, Russell had already made a point on violence : 
I have always held, and publicly stated, that the use of force in revolutions is not
necessarily to be condemned. Until lately, this was merely an academic reservation,
without relevance to the actual situation. Now, however, it has become a pressing
practical consideration. A certain amount of bloodshed occurred during the Russian
Revolution, probably unnecessarily. If it was unnecessary, I can of course condemn
it; but if the revolution could not be accomplished without it, I cannot condemn it.
35 
26 In these three articles, he elaborated in greater detail on the notion of violence. It is
wrong  according  to  him to  necessarily  connect  revolution  with  violence.  Revolution
strives to build a world without violence, despite the frequent resort to it in the early
stages of revolution. Any revolution spurred by hatred and a thirst for revenge will only
end up with a new form of domination, a mere change of rulers. He painstakingly tries to
show that the source of the revolutionary spirit and the source of pacifism are ultimately
analogous. The risk of violence exists but it is worth taking that chance. Also, the risk has
been greater in a country like Russia, led by a despotic family since times immemorial. He
argues time and again that in Britain, “The sort of movement which achieves its ends through
violence and civil war is extremely improbable in a country where the Government has acquired
the  habit  of  being  responsive  to  public  opinion”,  36 a  typically  liberal  view  which  was
expressed later by Orwell, who generalized on the notion that “The English are not good
haters”37. Hence the interiorized need by the Powers that Be to mould, even to fabricate,
public  opinion:  this  fabrication  might  come  from  newspapers  themselves  (“Lord
Northcliffe’s Triumph”, The Labour Leader,  27. 05. 1915; “The Times on Revolution”, The
Pioneer, 06. 10. 1917), from the education system through its school books (“The Rights of
the War”, The Nation, 15. 08. 1914) or from the Church of England prelates (“A Valuable
Suggestion to the Bishop of Exeter”,  The Tribunal,  11.  10.  1917).  Needless to say such
articles would wield a deep influence on radical thinkers like, again, George Orwell and
Noam Chomsky. 
 
Bitter epiphany at Southgate
27 On July 28th 1917, six weeks after the encouraging Leeds Convention, Russell attended a
(normally) secret meeting at Southgate Brotherhood Church, in what today would be
Hackney. The pacifist crowd gathered there to discuss whether the creation of a London
Soviet  was feasible.  It  seems that  Russell  himself  was ready to accept  the burden of
leading this Soviet, which never materialized. The information about the meeting had
just been leaked to Basil Thompson, chief of the Special Branch,38 who wrote in his diary
on July 27th: “They [the pacifists] will have a rude awakening tomorrow, as I have arranged with
the Daily Express to publish the place of their meeting, and a strong opposition may be expected.
The same may be expected at Swansea next week”. 39 Russell was right to point to a tightly-
knit coalition between the various agents of the State. Yet he was wrong to believe that
the State itself was afraid of the revolutionary potential in Britain: by the summer of
1917,  the  government  would  ruthlessly  disrupt  the  connections  made  between  the
pacifist  and  the  revolutionary  movements,  arresting  the  leaders,  raiding  places  of
sedition, destroying printing facilities. 
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28 At Southgate Brotherhood Church, the angry crowd which disrupted the meeting was
made up of two distinct groups : drunken louts (including many women) there to avenge
themselves against “German spies” or to just have fun, and young soldiers who had been
manipulated into believing that the pacifists were traitors and shirkers that should be
taught  a  lesson.  Russell  recalls  in his  autobiography how he was saved by a  pacifist
woman, the crowd that singled him out not daring to harass a female. 40 When he came
home after that harrowing experience, he wrote to Ottoline Morrell: “I realized vividly how
ghastly the spirit of violence is, and how utterly I repudiate it, on whatever side it may be. The mob
is a terrible thing when it wants blood. The young soldiers were pathetic, thinking we were their
enemies. They all believed we were in the pay of the Kaiser”41. The theoretical legitimation of
violence he had given under certain circumstances in his resignation letter, and which
had become a pressing pragmatic matter,  crumbled in a few minutes with the actual
witnessing of violence.
29 This traumatic event he also recalls  in a moving text,  “Crucify Him! Crucify Him!”,42
which, quite extraordinarily, strikes an optimistic chord of sorts. He recalls the way much
of the pacifist crowd inside the Church remained completely still for a while, generating a
sense of unease among the aggressors. He then contemplates how this behaviour could be
transformed, to the pacifists’ advantage, into wholesale passive resistance: some people
would be wounded,  but  ultimately the mob would realize how brave these supposed
shirkers were, and how futile violence is when it is not being resisted. 
30 After Southgate, Russell had a two-week break in Shropshire with his mistress Constance
Malleson. He would continue his work as an editorialist for The Tribunal, and one of the
articles he published in 1918 would cause his imprisonment. In “The German Peace Offer”
(03. 01. 1918), he refers to the way an American garrison could well be used after the war
to disrupt  strikes  in England and France and assist strike-breakers,  a  fairly common
practice in the U.S. He was sentenced to six months in prison for making a “statement
likely to prejudice His Majesty’s relations with a foreign power”. There was a double irony here:
first, he had already made a similar statement in “Imperialist Anxieties” (The Tribunal, 30.
08. 1917) which hadn’t caused such a stir. Secondly, he was sent to prison at a time when
he was seriously thinking about going back to philosophy. He finally served four and a
half months, as a second division prisoner, i. e. in fairly good conditions which made it
possible for him to read, write, and eat a bit of chocolate. The irredeemable damage the
likes of Allen and Morel had suffered as first division prisoners would fortunately be
spared to Russell. To have such a renowned scholar serve a prison sentence can only have
been decided at the very highest level: now that most N.C.F and U.D.C leaders were jailed
or too weak to be a threat, it was time for “one of the most mischievous cranks” in the
country to be silenced. The decision not to class Russell as a second division prisoner
(where conditions were very harsh) but as a first division prisoner was explained on the
grounds that “it would be a great loss to the country if Mr Russell, a man of great distinction,
were confined in such a form that his abilities would not have full scope”.43 Apparently, this
decision too was taken at a very high level, possibly by Balfour, who had been trained as a
philosopher. 
 
Conclusion: pacifism and the solitary condition 
31 One of the editors of the Collected Papers argues that “Russell wrote and talked so much
to people who shared his pacifist values that he often failed to grasp just how small a
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minority of his countrymen agreed with these ideas”.44 The night the war was declared,
Russell felt a pang of estrangement when he witnessed the joy of the London crowds
welcoming the conflict with Germany. More than four years later, he recalled the time
immediately after the armistice: “The crowd was frivolous still, and had learned nothing
during the period of horror, except to snatch at pleasure more recklessly than before. I
felt strangely solitary amid the rejoicings, like a ghost dropped by accident from some
other planet”. 45 To be sure, one of the reasons for such gloom was that, ever since the
first days of the war,  Russell  had warned against the perils in any humiliating peace
treaty against Germany. Like Keynes or Gandhi, but as early as 1914, Russell stressed the
need to draw a historical lesson from the spirit of revanchisme which the French had
nourished after 1870.46 The disappointment with the treaty of Versailles, the failure of the
Wilsonian internationalist ideal and his own disillusionment with both Russia -that he
visited in 1919- and the United States, meant that one of the key intellectuals of the 20th
century remained in the background for much of the 1920s and 1930s. 
32 Martin Ceadel explains the geographical justification for his title Semi-Detached Idealists
by referring to the way British pacifists were “close enough to the continent to fear being
drawn  into  any  major  war  which  breaks  out  there,  yet  distant  enough  not  to  be
permanently  anxious  about  national  security”.47 More  than  anybody  else,  Russell
embodied that type of pacifist: drawn to admire Germany because of his philosophical
training, tending to despise Tsarist Russia through his liberalism and his friendship with
Ludwig Wittgenstein and Joseph Conrad,  Russell  was  also  a  pacifist  because  his  own
positive and negative prejudices make him suspicious of a war where Britain allied itself
with Russia against Germany. Pacifism is very often bound up with internationalism, and
it is also in this way that Russell’s internationalism needs to be appraised. 
33 In order to articulate the best definition of pacifism, Russell was inspired by personal,
national as well as international events, like many of his comrades. But unlike them, he
combined a dogged spirit of activism with a vast knowledge in different fields: moral
philosophy, history, economics, politics, and to a lesser extent psychology, which helped
him fathom the “Prussian lurking” in the warlike instincts of  the British.  Frequently
arguing  that  he  had  more  in  common  with  a  German  pacifist  than  with  a British
warmonger,  Russell  defended a pacifism which drew all  these elements together in a
complex  skein,  and  made  the  notion  of  peace  for  peace’s  sake  a  somewhat  naive
irrelevance. 
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ABSTRACTS
Bertrand  Russell  (1872-1970),  one  of  the  towering  intellectuals  of  the  20th  century,  was  an
indefatigable pacifist throughout the Great War. But his pacifism was not unreserved, depending
as it did on his consequentialist attitude towards war and towards pacifism. This chapter gives a
description and analysis of the key stages in Russell’s political itinerary from 1914 to 1918 : on
the declaration of war, on the introduction of conscription, at the time of the Russian revolutions
and when there appeared the prospect of profound social and political changes in Britain.
Bertrand Russell (1872-1970), un des plus grands intellectuels du 20ème siècle, fut un infatigable
pacifiste pendant la Première Guerre Mondiale. Mais ce pacifisme n’était pas sans condition, chez
un philosophe libéral à l’approche conséquentialiste, tant par rapport à la guerre elle-même que
par  rapport  au  pacifisme.  Ce  chapitre  offre  une  description  et  une  analyse  des  principaux
épisodes de l’itinéraire intellectuel de Russell entre 1914 et 1918 : entrée en guerre, introduction
de  la  conscription,  révolutions  russes  et  possibilité  de  changements  politiques  et  sociaux
radicaux en Grande-Bretagne. 
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